Alphabetical list of titles
Benchmarking of CFD Codes for Application to Nuclear Reactor Safety (CFD4NRS) - CD-ROM Workshop Proceedings, Garching (Munich), Germany, 5-7 September 2006 (2007)
Building, Measuring and Improving Public Confidence in the Nuclear Regulator Workshop Proceedings, Ottawa, Canada, 18-20 May 2004 (2006)
CSNI Collective Statement on Support Facilities for Existing and Advanced Reactors/Déclaration collective du CSIN sur les installations de recherche pour les réacteurs actuels et avancés The Function of OECD/NEA Joint Projects - NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI)/Utilité des projets communs de l'OCDE/AEN - Comité de l'AEN sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires (CSIN) (2008)
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - No. 10 The Role of Human and Organisational Factors in Nuclear Power Plant Modifications (2009)
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - No. 11 Better Nuclear Plant Maintenance: Improving Human and Organisational Performance (2009)
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - No. 12 Research on Human Factors in New Nuclear Plant Technology (2009)
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - No. 9 Level-2 PSA for Nuclear Power Plants (2007)
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - Nos. 7-8 Living PSA and its Use in the Nuclear Safety Decision-making Process - Development and Use of Risk Monitors at Nuclear Power Plants (2005)
Evaluation of Uncertainties in Relation to Severe Accident and Level-2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis - CD-ROM Workshop Proceedings, Aix-en-Provence, France, 7-9 November 2005 (2007)
Experimental Facilities for Gas-cooled Reactor Safety Studies Task Group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF) (2009)
Experiments and CFD Code Application to Nuclear Reactor Safety (XCFD4NRS) Workshop Proceedings, Grenoble, France, 10-12 September 2008 (2010)
Improving Nuclear Regulation Compilation of NEA Regulatory Guidance Booklets (2009)
Joint CSNI/CNRA Strategic Plan and Mandates 2005-2009 (2005)
Learning from Nuclear Regulatory Self-assessment International Peer Review of the CSN Report on Lessons Learnt from the Essential Service Water System Degradation Event at the Vandellos Nuclear Power Plant (2006)
Nuclear Fuel Behaviour in Loss-of-coolant Accident (LOCA) Conditions State-of-the-art Report (2009)
Nuclear Fuel Behaviour under Reactivity-initiated Accident (RIA) Conditions State-of-the-art Report (2010)
Nuclear Power Plant Operating Experiences from the IAEA/NEA Incident Reporting System 2002-2005 (2006)
Nuclear Regulatory Decision Making (2005)
Nuclear Safety Research in OECD Countries Support Facilities for Existing and Advanced Reactors (SFEAR) (2007)
Regulatory Challenges in Using Nuclear Operating Experience (2006)
Review of the Role, Activities and Working Methods of the CNRA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) (2005)
Review of the Role, Activities and Working Methods of the CSNI Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) (2005)
The Regulatory Goal of Assuring Nuclear Safety (2008)
The Role of Research in a Regulatory Context (RRRC-2) Workshop Proceedings, Paris, France, 5 December 2007 (2008)
The Safety of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (2005)
Transparency of Nuclear Regulatory Activities Workshop Proceedings,Tokyo and Tokai-Mura, Japan, 22-24 May 2007 (2007)
Synopsis
The NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) has recently completed a study on the availability and utilisation of facilities supporting safety studies for current and advanced nuclear power reactors. The study showed that significant steps had been undertaken in the past several years in support of safety test facilities, mainly by conducting multinational joint projects centered on the capability of unique test facilities worldwide.
Given the positive experience of the safety research projects, it has been recommended that efforts be made to prioritise technical issues associated with advanced (Generation IV) reactor designs and to develop options on how to efficiently obtain the necessary data through internationally co-ordinated research, preparing a gradual extension of safety research beyond the needs set by currently operating reactors.
This statement constitutes a reference for future CSNI activities and for safety authorities, R&D centres and industry for internationally co-ordinated research initiatives in the nuclear safety research area.
Le Comité de l’AEN sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires (CSIN) a récemment achevé une étude sur la disponibilité et l’utilisation des installations en soutien aux études de sûreté pour les réacteurs nucléaires actuels et avancés. L’étude révèle qu’au cours des dernières années des mesures importantes ont été prises afin de soutenir les installations expérimentales pour la sûreté, essentiellement consistant en la mise en œuvre de projets multinationaux centrés sur le caractère unique de certaines installations dans le monde.
Au vu de l’expérience positive des projets de recherche en sûreté, il a été recommandé que des efforts soient faits pour hiérarchiser les questions techniques associées aux conceptions de réacteurs avancés (Génération IV) et de proposer des solutions pour obtenir efficacement les données nécessaires au moyen d’une recherche internationale coordonnée en préparant une extension progressive de la recherche en sûreté au-delà des besoins correspondant aux réacteurs actuellement en exploitation.
Cette déclaration constitue une référence pour les activités futures du CSIN ainsi que pour les autorités de sûreté, les centres de R-D et l’industrie en vue d’initiatives coordonnées de recherche internationale dans le domaine de la sûreté nucléaire.
Synopsis
Considerable experimental and analytical work has been performed in recent years which has led to a broader and deeper understanding of phenomena related to reactivity-initiated accidents (RIAs). Further, newly designed fuels – such as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel and rods with new cladding – have been introduced which might behave differently than those used previously, both under normal operating conditions and during transients. Compared with 20 years ago, fuel burn-up has been significantly increased. These and other factors have led the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and its Working Group on Fuel Safety to produce this state-of-the-art report. The report should be of particular interest to nuclear safety regulators, nuclear plant operators and fuel researchers.
Synopsis
Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) is to an increasing extent being adopted in nuclear reactor safety (NRS) analyses as a tool that enables a better description of specific safety-relevant phenomena occurring in nuclear reactors. The NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) has in recent years conducted important activities in the CFD area, including the organisation of two workshops. The “XCFD4NRS” workshop was the second in the series and was held in Grenoble, France in September 2008. A total of 147 experts from 22 countries took part. These proceedings contain the five keynote lectures, summaries of the activities of three CFD writing groups and the 59 technical papers presented at the workshop.
Synopsis
This report provides an overview of experimental facilities that can be used to carry out nuclear safety research for gas-cooled reactors and identifies priorities for organising international co-operative programmes at selected facilities. The information has been collected and analysed by a Task Group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF) as part of an ongoing initiative of the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) which aims to define and to implement a strategy for the efficient utilisation of facilities and resources for Generation IV reactor systems.
This publication is also available in as: Avis techniques du CSIN - n° 12 - Recherches sur le facteur humain dans les nouvelles centrales nucléaires
Synopsis
It is a dynamic time for the nuclear power sector. Existing reactor control rooms are undergoing various forms of modernisation. New reactors are being built in many countries and advanced reactors are being designed through international co-operation to support power generation for decades to come. The new technologies and concepts that are being considered in this context could impact upon the roles of the plant operators and thus plant safety. It is therefore important that the potential implications – both positive and negative – are evaluated and understood.
Through this technical opinion paper, the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) has sought to identify a set of research topics that should be explored in order to enhance knowledge of the human and organisational factors concerned. Research to address the topics described in this paper will provide the technical basis to help ensure that the benefits of new technology are realised and that the potential negative effects are minimised.
This paper should be of particular interest to research organisations and other stakeholders (including regulatory agencies, international organisations and industry organisations) that could support this research and benefit from its results.
Synopsis
Considerable experimental and analytical work has been performed in recent years which has led to a broader and deeper understanding of phenomena related to loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). Further, new cladding alloys have been produced, which might behave differently than the previously used Zircaloy-4, both under normal operating conditions and during transients. Compared with 20 years ago, fuel burn-up has been significantly increased. These and other factors have led the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and its Working Group on Fuel Safety to produce this state-of-the-art report. The report should be of particular interest to nuclear safety regulators, nuclear power plant operators and nuclear fuel researchers.
Synopsis
A common theme throughout the series of NEA regulatory guidance reports, or “green booklets”, is the premise that the fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that nuclear facilities are operated at all times and later decommissioned in an acceptably safe manner. In meeting this objective the regulator must keep in mind that it is the operator that has responsibility for safely operating a nuclear facility; the role of the regulator is to oversee the operator’s activities as related to assuming that responsibility.
For the first time, the full series of these reports have been brought together in one edition. As such, it is intended to serve as a knowledge management tool both for current regulators and the younger generation of nuclear experts entering the regulatory field. While the audience for this publication is primarily nuclear regulators, the information and ideas may also be of interest to nuclear operators, other nuclear industry organisations and the general public.
This publication is also available in French as: Avis techniques du CSIN - No. 11 - Améliorer la maintenance des centrales nucléaires en optimisant les performances humaines et organisationnelles
Synopsis
Errors during maintenance and periodic testing are significant contributors to plant events. These errors may not always be revealed by post-maintenance tests and may remain undetected for extended periods until the affected system is called upon to function. It is therefore important that the plant maintenance process take into account the potential impact of human and organisational errors, and that it incorporate suitable measures to minimise the potential for such errors.
The NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and its Working Group on Human and Organisational Factors organised an international workshop to discuss the role of human and organisational performance on maintenance. This technical opinion paper represents the consensus of specialists on human and organisational factors in NEA member countries on commendable practices and approaches to dealing with nuclear power plant maintenance. It sets out a framework for including a systematic consideration of human and organisational factors in the plant maintenance process. The paper should be of particular interest to nuclear safety regulators and nuclear power plant operators.
This publication is also available in French as: Avis techniques du CSIN - n° 10 - Le rôle des facteurs humains et organisationnels dans les modifications des centrales nucléaires
Synopsis
Nuclear power plant modifications may be needed for a number of different reasons. These include physical ageing of plant systems, structures and components; obsolescence in hardware and software; feedback from operating experience; and opportunities for improved plant safety, reliability or capability. However, experience has also shown that weaknesses in the design and/or implementation of modifications can present significant challenges to plant safety. They can also have a considerable impact on the commercial performance of the plant. It is therefore important that the plant modification process reflect a recognition of the potential impact of human errors and that it incorporate suitable measures to minimise the potential for such errors.
In this context, the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and its Working Group on Human and Organisational Factors organised an international workshop in 2003 to discuss the role of human and organisational performance in the nuclear plant modification process. This technical opinion paper represents the consensus of specialists in human and organisational factors (HOF) in the NEA member countries on commendable practices and approaches to dealing with nuclear plant modifications. It considers factors that should be taken into account when developing a modification process and identifies some lessons learnt from application of the process. The paper should be of particular interest of nuclear safety regulators and nuclear power plant operators.
This publication is also available in French as: Assurer la sûreté nucléaire : la mission des autorités réglementaires -
Synopsis
The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that nuclear facilities are operated, as well as decommissioned, in an acceptably safe manner. However, in meeting this objective the regulator must keep in mind that it is the operator that has responsibility for safely operating a nuclear facility; the role of the regulator is to oversee the operator’s activities as related to assuming that responsibility.
There are currently many sources of information available to the regulator pertaining to safety at any given nuclear facility, such as inspection reports, operating experience reports, research results, periodic safety reviews, probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) results, insights from IAEA reviews and other similar information. A major challenge for the regulator is to systematically collect and analyse this information in order to arrive at an integrated assessment of the level of safety of the particular facility and then to make a judgement about its acceptability. In order to assist member countries in addressing this challenging question, the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has sponsored this report.
The primary focus of the report is on how the regulatory body can systematically collect and make an integrated analysis of all the relevant safety information available to it and arrive at a sound judgement on the acceptability of the level of safety of the facilities that it regulates. It therefore follows that the target audience for this report is primarily nuclear regulators, although the information and ideas may also be of interest to nuclear operators, other nuclear industry organisations and segments of civil society.
Synopsis
This workshop enabled the exchange of experience among regulators, research managers and industry on the needs, priorities and foreseeable trends for nuclear safety research in a regulatory context. It also addressed the means that are or can be used for effectively performing such research.
The presentations highlighted priority safety issues, at present and in the near term, for operating plants and new reactors. During the workshop, participants discussed the challenges that the nuclear community will face in the long term for performing safety evaluations of advanced reactor designs, and explored various avenues for organising the research and infrastructure that will be needed.
These proceedings will be of particular interest to nuclear specialists and research managers wishing to obtain an international perspective of current and foreseeable needs in regulatory-driven nuclear safety research.
Synopsis
One of the main missions of nuclear regulators is to protect the public, and this cannot be completely achieved without public confidence. The more a regulatory process is transparent, the more such confidence will grow. Despite important cultural differences across countries, a number of common features characterise media and public expectations regarding any activity with an associated risk.
A common understanding of transparency and main stakeholders' expectations in the field of nuclear safety were identified during this workshop, together with a number of conditions and practices aimed at improving the transparency of nuclear regulatory activities. These conditions and practices are described herein, and will be of particular interest to all those working in the nuclear regulatory field. Their implementation may, however, differ from one country to another depending on national context.
This publication is also available in French as: Avis techniques du CSIN - N° 9 - EPS de niveau 2 des centrales nucléaires
Synopsis
This technical opinion paper represents the consensus of risk analysts in NEA member countries on the current state of the art of level-2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and its applications in accident management of nuclear power plants. Level-2 PSA models the phenomena that could occur following the onset of core damage that have the potential to challenge the containment integrity and lead to a release of radioactive material to the environment. The paper's objective is to present decision makers in the nuclear field with a clear technical opinion on the status as implemented in industrial PSAs.
The intended audience is primarily nuclear safety regulators, researchers and industry representatives dealing with safety management and severe accidents. Government authorities and nuclear power plant operators may also be interested in the paper.
CSNI: NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations.
Synopsis
This report provides an overview of experimental facilities that can be used to address nuclear safety research issues in OECD member countries, and identifies priorities for organising international co-operative programmes centred on selected facilities. The information has been gathered and analysed by a Senior Group of Experts on Nuclear Safety Research, in the context of an ongoing initiative of the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) aimed at maintaining critical experimental infrastructure for nuclear safety studies in member countries.
Synopsis
On 5-7 September 2006, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency organised a workshop on Benchmarking of CFD Codes for Application to Nuclear Reactor Safety (CFD4NRS) in co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The workshop was hosted in Germany by the Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS). The purpose of the workshop was to provide a forum for numerical analysts and experimentalists to exchange information on nuclear reactor safety activities relevant to computational fluid dynamics (CFD) validation, with the objective of providing input to create a practical, state-of-the-art, web-based assessment matrix on the use of CFD for nuclear reactor safety applications. These proceedings contain the 39 technical papers presented at the workshop, which was attended by 100 participants.
Synopsis
Uncertainty in relation to several severe accident phenomena plays a major role in probabilistic safety analyses involving beyond-design-basis accident scenarios for nuclear power plants. The technical papers presented herein will be valuable for nuclear safety analysts, nuclear power plant designers and R&D managers, especially with regard to unresolved severe accident issues or issues where risk uncertainty is high.
Synopsis
Nuclear regulatory self-assessment together with the benchmarking of regulatory practices against those of other countries operating nuclear power plants are key elements in maintaining a high level of nuclear safety. In that light, the Spanish Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) formally asked the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) to establish an international peer review team to assess the CSN report on the lessons learnt as a result of the 2004 Vandellós II event involving essential service water system degradation.
The International Review Team considers the CSN report prepared in follow-up to the Vandellós event to be a commendable effort in regulatory self-assessment. The report, complemented by this international peer review, should enable the CSN to take appropriate action to ensure that its regulatory supervision is in line with best international practice.
Synopsis
The Incident Reporting System (IRS) is an essential element of the international operating experience feedback system for nuclear power plants. The IRS is jointly operated and managed by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), a semi-autonomous body within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a specialised agency within the United Nations System.
Synopsis
An important factor for public confidence in the nuclear regulator is the general public trust of the government and its representatives, which is clearly not the same in all countries. Likewise, cultural differences between countries can be considerable, and similar means of communication between government authorities and the public may not be universally effective.
Nevertheless, this workshop identified a number of common principles for the communication of nuclear regulatory decisions that can be recommended to all regulators. They have been cited in particular for their ability to help build, measure and/or improve overall public confidence in the nuclear regulator.
This publication is also available in French as: L'utilisation du retour d'expérience : défis pour les autorités de sûreté nucléaire -
Synopsis
The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that nuclear utilities operate their plants in an acceptably safe manner at all times. Learning from experience has been a key element in meeting this objective. It is therefore very important for nuclear power plant operators to have an active programme for collecting, analysing and acting on the lessons of operating experience that could affect the safety of their plants.
NEA experts have noted that almost all of the recent, significant events reported at international meetings have occurred earlier in one form or another. Counter-actions are usually well-known, but information does not always seem to reach end users, or corrective action programmes are not always rigorously applied. Thus, one of the challenges that needs to be met in order to maintain good operational safety performance is to ensure that operating experience is promptly reported to established reporting systems, preferably international in order to benefit from a larger base of experience, and that the lessons from operating experience are actually used to promote safety.
This report focuses on how regulatory bodies can ensure that operating experience is used effectively to promote the safety of nuclear power plants. While directed at nuclear power plants, the principles in this report may apply to other nuclear facilities as well.
Synopsis
This report, prepared by a senior-level assessment group, describes the current role, priorities and working methods of the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI), identifies and analyses issues of concern, and suggests ways to further increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the committee. It also reviews CSNI interactions with the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), the other NEA standing technical committees and international organisations, and suggests ways to improve co-ordination and co-operation. In closing, conclusions are drawn and recommendations made concerning the future operation and role of the committee.
This publication is also available in French as: La sûreté du cycle du combustible nucléaire -
Synopsis
The procurement and preparation of fuel for nuclear power reactors, followed by its recovery, processing and management subsequent to reactor discharge, are frequently referred to as the "front end" and "back end" of the nuclear fuel cycle. The facilities associated with these activities have an extensive and well-documented safety record accumulated over the past 50 years by technical experts and safety authorities. This information has enabled an in-depth analysis of the complete fuel cycle.
Preceded by two previous editions in 1981 and 1993, this new edition of the Safety of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle represents the most up-to-date analysis of the safety aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. It will be of considerable interest to nuclear safety experts, but also to those wishing to acquire extensive information about the fuel cycle more generally.
This publication is also available in French as: -
Synopsis
This report, prepared by an independent review group, characterises the current role, priorities and working methods of the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), identifies and analyses issues of concern, and suggests ways to further increase the efficiency and effectiveness as well as the visibility of the committee. It also reviews the role and interactions between the CNRA and the other NEA standing technical committees and international organisations, and suggests ways to improve co-ordination and co-operation.
In formulating its report, the review group examined various CNRA documents (e.g. summary records, reports) interviewed past and present CNRA members, standing technical committee chairs and others, and gathered additional input through a questionnaire.
Conclusions and recommendations have been derived concerning the mid-term and long-term role and orientation of the committee and, in particular, the balance between technical- and policy-related activities.
This publication is also available in French as: Plan stratégique conjoint du CSIN et du CANR et mandats - 2005-2009
Synopsis
The mission of the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) and the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) is to assist member countries in maintaining and further developing the knowledge, competence and infrastructure needed to support the safe operation of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities throughout their life cycle, as well as their efficient and effective regulation based upon sound technical information, shared experience and up-to-date methods.
Readers will find the committee's mission, joint strategic plan and mandates herein.
This publication is also available in French as: La prise de décision en matière de réglementation nucléaire -
Synopsis
The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that nuclear utilities operate their plants at all times in an acceptably safe manner. In meeting this objective, the regulatory body should strive to ensure that its regulatory decisions are technically sound, consistent from case to case, and timely. In addition, the regulator must be aware that its decisions and the circumstances surrounding those decisions can affect how its stakeholders, such as government policy makers, the industry it regulates, and the public, view it as an effective and credible regulator. In order to maintain the confidence of those stakeholders, the regulator should make sure that its decisions are transparent, have a clear basis in law and regulations, and are seen by impartial observers to be fair to all parties.
Based on the work of a Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) expert group, this report discusses some of the basic principles and criteria that a regulatory body should consider in making decisions and describes the elements of an integrated framework for regulatory decision making.
This publication is also available in French as: Avis techniques du CSIN - Nos 7-8 - EPS vivante et son utilisation dans le processus décisionnel en matière de sureté nucléaire - Mise au point et utilisation de l'EPS temps réel dans
Synopsis
Probabilistic safety analyses (PSAs) for many of the nuclear power plants throughout the world are being maintained as "living PSAs" (LPSAs), being updated to take account of changes to the design and operation of the plant, improvements in the understanding of how the plant behaves in fault situations and improved PSA methods, models and data. One of the specific applications of a living PSA is the risk monitor, used by operators and regulators to provide risk information employed in the decision-making process to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Since the first risk monitors were put into operation in 1988, the number of risk monitors worldwide has increased rapidly. By the end of 2003 there were more than 110 in operation and this figure should increase to over 150 when those monitors being developed are placed in service.
Combining these two technical opinion papers into a single publication provides the reader - notably senior researchers and industry leaders, nuclear safety regulators, nuclear power plant operators - with a concise assessment of the current state of the art, thus enabling better analysis when evaluating proposals or the development of these applications.
CSNI: NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations.
This publication is also available in English as: CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - No. 11 - Better Nuclear Plant Maintenance: Improving Human and Organisational Performance
Synopsis
Les erreurs durant la maintenance et les essais périodiques contribuent de manière significative aux incidents dans les centrales. Ces erreurs peuvent ne pas toujours être mises en évidence par les essais post-maintenance et peuvent longtemps passer inaperçues jusqu’à ce que le système touché soit amené à fonctionner. Il importe donc que le processus de maintenance des centrales prenne en considération l’impact possible des erreurs humaines et organisationnelles et qu’il comporte des mesures adaptées pour réduire au minimum ces erreurs.
Le Comité sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires (CSIN) de l’AEN et son Groupe de travail sur les facteurs humains et organisationnels ont organisé un atelier international pour analyser l’impact des facteurs humains et organisationnels sur la maintenance. Cet avis technique reflète le consensus des spécialistes des facteurs humains et organisationnels des pays membres de l’AEN sur des pratiques et approches conseillées pour réaliser les opérations de maintenance dans les centrales nucléaires. Il présente un système pour intégrer la prise en compte systématique des facteurs humains et organisationnels dans le processus de maintenance d’une centrale. Cet avis devrait particulièrement intéresser les autorités de sûreté nucléaire et les exploitants des centrales nucléaires.
This publication is also available in English as: CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - No. 10 - The Role of Human and Organisational Factors in Nuclear Plant Modifications
Synopsis
Il peut être nécessaire d’apporter des modifications à une centrale nucléaire pour diverses raisons : le vieillissement des systèmes, des structures et des composants de la centrale, l’obsolescence du matériel et des logiciels, le retour d’expérience et les possibilités d’améliorer la sûreté, la fiabilité ou les capacités de la centrale. Or, l’expérience a montré que des défaillances au niveau de la conception et/ou de la mise en œuvre des modifications pouvaient présenter des défis importants pour la sûreté des centrales. Elles peuvent également avoir une incidence non négligeable sur les résultats commerciaux de l’installation. C’est pourquoi, il importe que le processus de modification concrétise la prise en compte de l’impact possible des erreurs humaines et qu’il comporte des dispositions appropriées pour réduire au maximum l’éventualité de ces erreurs.
Dans ce contexte, le Comité sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires (CSIN) et son Groupe de travail sur les facteurs humains et organisationnels ont organisé, en 2003, un atelier international pour examiner le rôle des performances humaines et organisationnelles dans le processus de modification des centrales nucléaires. Cet avis technique reflète le consensus des spécialistes des facteurs humains et organisationnels des pays membres de l’AEN sur les pratiques et approches recommandées en matière de modification des centrales nucléaires. Il examine les facteurs qui devraient être pris en compte au cours de l’élaboration d’un processus de modification et recense quelques-uns des enseignements tirés de l’application de ce processus. Cet avis technique devrait particulièrement intéresser les exploitants des centrales nucléaires ainsi que les autorités de sûreté nucléaire.
This publication is also available in English as: The Regulatory Goal of Assuring Nuclear Safety -
Synopsis
La mission fondamentale de toutes les autorités de sûreté nucléaire consiste à s’assurer que les installations nucléaires sont à tout moment exploitées de manière sûre puis démantelées en toute sécurité. Dans l’accomplissement de sa mission, l’autorité de sûreté ne doit pas oublier que la responsabilité d’exploiter en toute sécurité une installation nucléaire revient à l’exploitant et que la sienne est de contrôler les activités de l’exploitant pour s’assurer que les conditions de fonctionnement de l’installation sont sûres.
Aujourd’hui l’autorité de sûreté dispose de nombreuses sources d’informations sur la sûreté d’une installation nucléaire : les rapports d’inspection, le retour d’expérience, les résultats des recherches, les examens périodiques de sûreté, les résultats des études probabilistes de sûreté (EPS), les enseignements tirés des audits de l’AIEA, pour n’en citer que quelques-unes. Un des principaux défis consiste alors à recueillir et à analyser systématiquement ces informations pour se faire une idée globale du niveau de sûreté de l’installation en question puis ensuite de juger si ce niveau est acceptable. C’est pour aider ses pays membres à relever ce défi que le Comité sur les activités nucléaires réglementaires (CANR) de l’Agence de l’OCDE pour l’énergie nucléaire a préparé ce rapport.
Le rapport s’intéresse essentiellement à la façon dont l’autorité de sûreté peut systématiquement recueillir et analyser de manière intégrée toutes les informations pertinentes sur la sûreté pour porter un jugement valide sur l’acceptabilité du niveau de la sûreté des installations qu’elle contrôle. Ce rapport s’adresse donc avant tout aux autorités de sûreté nucléaire, même si les informations et idées qu’il renferme sont susceptibles d’intéresser des exploitants nucléaires, d’autres organisations dans l’industrie nucléaire ainsi que certains membres du public.
This publication is also available in English as: CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - No. 9 - Level 2 PSA for Nuclear Power Plants
Synopsis
Cet avis technique représente le consensus des analystes de risque dans les pays membres de l’AEN sur l'état de l’art en matière d’études probabilistes de sûreté (EPS) et leurs applications à la gestion des accidents dans les centrales nucléaires. Les EPS de niveau 2 modélisent les phénomènes susceptibles de survenir après l'amorce d'une détérioration du cœur, de compromettre l’intégrité du confinement et d'entraîner le rejet de matières radioactives dans l’environnement. L’objectif de ce document est d'offrir aux décideurs dans ce domaine un avis technique clair sur l'état de l'EPS telle qu'elle est utilisée dans l'industrie.
Cet avis s'adresse principalement aux autorités de sûreté nucléaire, aux chercheurs et aux industriels concernés par la gestion de la sûreté et les accidents graves, mais il pourrait également intéresser les autorités publiques et les exploitants de centrales nucléaires.
CSIN : Comité de l'AEN sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires.
This publication is also available in English as: Regulatory Challenges in Using Nuclear Operating Experience -
Synopsis
La raison d'être des autorités de sûreté est de faire en sorte que les compagnies d'électricité exploitent leurs centrales nucléaires à tout moment de manière sûre. Pour atteindre cet objectif, l'expérience et ses enseignements se sont révélés précieux. Il est donc très important que tout exploitant nucléaire se dote d'un programme dynamique pour recueillir le retour d'expérience, analyser les informations intéressant la sûreté de ses centrales et prendre les mesures que dicte cette analyse.
Les experts de l'AEN ont constaté que la quasi-totalité des événements significatifs récents signalés lors de réunions internationales s'étaient déjà produits sous une forme ou sous une autre. Les contre-mesures sont généralement bien connues, mais l'information ne semble pas toujours parvenir aux utilisateurs finals, de même que les programmes d'actions correctrices ne sont pas toujours rigoureusement appliqués. Par conséquent, si l'on veut préserver l'excellent niveau de sûreté en exploitation obtenu à ce jour, il faut veiller à ce que le retour d'expérience soit communiqué sans délai aux systèmes établis de notification des événements, de préférence internationaux, pour que chacun puisse bénéficier d'une plus vaste expérience et que les enseignements qui en seront tirés soient effectivement exploités pour améliorer la sûreté.
Le présent rapport s'intéresse aux moyens dont disposent les autorités de sûreté pour s'assurer que le retour d'expérience est efficacement exploité pour améliorer la sûreté des centrales nucléaires. Bien que focalisé sur les centrales nucléaires, il énonce des principes qui s'appliquent également à d'autres installations nucléaires.
This publication is also available in English as: The Safety of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle -
Synopsis
On distingue habituellement deux phases dans le cycle du combustible nucléaire, l'amont et l'aval, qui recouvrent respectivement l'extraction et la préparation du combustible destiné aux réacteurs de puissance nucléaires, puis, après son passage en réacteur, la récupération, le traitement et la gestion du combustible irradié. Les installations utilisées pour ces activités bénéficient depuis plus de 50 ans de dossiers de sûreté complets et rigoureux préparés par les spécialistes et autorités de sûreté. Ces mêmes dossiers ont permis une analyse en profondeur de l'ensemble du cycle du combustible.
Précédée par une première édition en 1981, et une deuxième en 1993, cette nouvelle édition de La sûreté du cycle du combustible nucléaire est une analyse de pointe en ce qui concerne la sûreté du cycle du combustible. Elle sera d'un grand intérêt non seulement pour les experts en sûreté nucléaire, mais aussi pour tous ceux qui souhaitent obtenir des informations complètes sur le cycle du combustible en général.
This publication is also available in English as: Nuclear Regulatory Decision Making -
Synopsis
L'objectif fondamental de toutes les autorités de sûreté nucléaire est de veiller à ce que les compagnies d'électricité qui exploitent des centrales nucléaires le fassent en permanence de manière acceptable sur le plan de la sûreté. Dans la réalisation de cet objectif, l'autorité de sûreté doit s'attacher à faire en sorte que ses décisions réglementaires soient techniquement bien fondées, cohérentes d'une affaire à une autre, et prises en temps voulu. En outre, l'autorité de sûreté doit être consciente du fait que ses décisions et le contexte dans lequel elles se situent, peuvent déterminer la manière dont ses interlocuteurs, par exemple les responsables de l'action gouvernementale, l'industrie qu'elle réglemente et le public, la considèrent, comme un organisme de réglementation efficace et crédible. Afin de conserver la confiance de ces interlocuteurs, l'autorité de sûreté devrait s'assurer que ses décisions sont transparentes, ont un fondement bien défini sur le plan juridique et réglementaire et sont considérées par des observateurs impartiaux comme étant équitables pour toutes les parties.
Basé sur les travaux d'un Groupe d'experts de l'Agence pour l'énergie nucléaire (AEN), ce rapport analyse certains principes et critères fondamentaux dont une autorité de sûreté devrait tenir compte dans la prise de décision et décrit les éléments d'un cadre de référence intégré pour la prise de décisions réglementaires.
This publication is also available in English as: Joint CSNI/CNRA Strategic Plan and Mandates - 2005-2009
Synopsis
Le Comité sur les activités nucléaires réglementaires (CANR) et le Comité sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires (CSIN) ont pour mission d'aider les pays membres à maintenir et à faire progresser les connaissances, les compétences et l'infrastructure nécessaires à l'exploitation sûre des centrales nucléaires et des installations du cycle du combustible tout au long du cycle de vie, ainsi qu'à leur réglementation efficiente et efficace en se fondant sur des informations techniques fiables, une expérience partagée et les méthodes les plus modernes.
Les lecteurs trouveront dans cette publication la mission, le plan stratégique et les mandats de ces comités.
This publication is also available in English as: CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - Nos. 7-8 - Living PSA and its Use in the Nuclear Safety Decision-making Process - Development and Use of Risk Monitors at Nuclear Power Plants
Synopsis
Dans de nombreuses centrales nucléaires dans le monde, les études probabilistes de sûreté (EPS) sont gérées comme des "EPS vivantes" les adaptant en fonction des modifications apportées à la conception et à l'exploitation de la centrale concernée, des progrès réalisés dans la compréhension des comportements de la centrale en situations de défaillance et des améliorations dans les méthodes, les modèles et les données relatifs aux EPS. Une EPS vivante peut notamment déboucher sur une EPS temps réel, utilisée par les exploitants et les autorités de sûreté pour obtenir des données sur les risques destinées à alimenter le processus décisionnel visant à assurer la sûreté d'exploitation des centrales nucléaires. Depuis que les premières EPS temps réel ont été mises en place en 1988, leur nombre a augmenté rapidement de telle sorte qu'à la fin de 2003 plus de 110 étaient opérationnelles, et que le cap des 150 devrait être franchi lorsque celles en cours de développement seront implémentées.
La réunion de ces deux avis techniques dans une publication unique met à la disposition de l'audience visée - à savoir ici les directeurs de recherche et les dirigeants dans l'industrie nucléaire, les autorités de sûreté nucléaire, les exploitants de centrales - un bilan concis de l'état d'avancement des connaissances leur permettant de mieux analyser la situation au moment d'évaluer des propositions ou les progrès accomplis dans les applications.
CSIN : Comité de l'AEN sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires.
This publication is also available in English as: CSNI Technical Opinion Papers - No. 12 - Research on Human Factors in New Nuclear Plant Technology
Synopsis
Le secteur nucléaire connaît actuellement une phase dynamique. La modernisation des salles de commande des centrales prend diverses formes. De nouveaux réacteurs sont construits dans de nombreux pays. Des modèles avancés sont conçus dans le cadre de la coopération internationale afin d’assurer la production d'électricité au cours des prochaines décennies. Les nouveaux concepts et technologies étudiés dans ce contexte peuvent avoir un impact sur le rôle des exploitants de centrales et par conséquence sur la sûreté. Il est donc important d'évaluer et de comprendre ces incidences potentielles, qu'elles soient positives ou négatives.
Dans cet avis technique, le Comité de l’AEN sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires (CSIN) a cherché à identifier un ensemble de sujets de recherche à étudier pour la connaissance des facteurs humains et organisationnels concernés. Les recherches menées sur les sujets décrits devront fournir les connaissances techniques qui permettront de tirer parti des nouvelles technologies et d'en réduire le plus possible les éventuels effets négatifs.
Cet avis présentera un intérêt particulier pour les établissements de recherche et les autres acteurs (autorités de sûreté, organisations internationales et entreprises industrielles) susceptibles de contribuer à ces recherches et d'en bénéficier.