

Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction

Doosan's Nuclear I&C system

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Contents

- 1.Korea's NPP status
- 2.DOOSAN's Facility
- 3.Doosan Digital I&C Experience
- 4. Suggestions



Korea's NPP status & Korea Map

☐ Korea's NPP status (July 2011)

- 21 units operating
- 7 units under construction
- 8 units planned

Oversea

-UAE # 1, 2,3,4

-Yonggwang Nuclear Power Site # 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6



- **–Ulchin Nuclear Power Site** # 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
- -Shin-Ulchin #1,2
- -Shin-Ulchin #3,4
- -Wolsong Nuclear Power Site # 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
- -Shin-Wolsong #1,2
- -Kori Nuclear Power Site
- # 1, 2, 3, 4
- -Shin-Kori #1
- -Shin-Kori # 2, 3, 4
- -Shin-Kori # 5,6



-NPP in Operation



-NPP under Construction



-NPP Planed



DOOSAN's Facility

□ INTEGRAGED MANUFACTURING COMPLEX

DOOSAN has an integrated manufacturing facility which is capable of from raw material production to final assembly of components for Power Plants in Changwon, Korea.





Doosan Digital I&C Experience

□ National R&D Project : KNICS(2001. 7 ~ 2008.4)

☐ KINS SER

- → Acquisition of Safety Evaluation Report from KINS(Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety)
- Plant Protection System, Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System, Reactor Core Protection System, Class-1E Programmable Logic Controller('09/2/18)

☐ IAEA Review

- → Objective
- Improve the acceptance and reliability of the DOOSAN I&C system.
- Assist in developing a firm design basis for projects in the domestic and international markets

☐ Strength of Doosan I&C

- → Pre-installation validation using integrated performance and validation test facility
- → Third party review and KINS safety evaluation during R&D phase.
- → Application of PLDs a development process that is similar to the software development process.
- → Application of TTL logic downstream of the main priority logic(diversity policy)
- → Fault tolerance structure of PPS(2 bistable processor and 3 coincidence processor per each channel) & ESF-CCS(2 out of 3 structure)
- → Design of the control rod control system eliminating single point vulnerability.



Doosan Digital I&C Experience

☐ Shin-Ulchin #1, 2 under manufacturing

□ Control Rod System(CRCS/CEDM-CS)

- Contracted 12 units.
- 4 units supplied.
- Main Features
 - Eliminate SPVs
 - 1)Double & DC Holder: Never drop the CEAs except RPCS or PPS
 - 2)Full redundant Design: Any single failure will not affect the normal operation
 - Enhance the Operability & Maintainability
 - 1) MTP MMI: Easily Find the Root Cause
 - 2) Drawer type PCM

□ ASTS(Automatic seismic trip system)

- Contracted 20 units(Kori 4 units, Yonggwang 6 units, Wolsong 4 units, Ulchin 6 units)
- 4 units supplied.



Suggestions(based on Doosan experience)


From 2008 to 2010, AREVA, Westinghouse & EDF suggested and commented issues in the view point of supplier/vendor/system designer



System designer is different from each other



slow start, long stride & high propulsion, finish spurt or quick start, early propulsion & manages the race







Suggestions(based on Doosan experience)

- It is important to harmonize existing regulatory environment. However it takes long and difficult work
- As a more effective way, it is better to develop a common regulatory position(ex. cyber security, FPGA based controller, CGID)
- There was a drastic change in some standards(ex. EPRI TR 102323), which could burden nuclear vendors.

